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Abstract-Password authentication isone of the most common and elementary applications of encryption 
techniques, and when these authentication services are embedded into the underlying operating system, 
their security is usually assured. However, there are an increasing number of systems requiring 
authentication services which are layered on top of a host operating system. In these cases, the security 
of the application system is highly dependent on the security of the password file, and, when operating 
outside the host operating system, compromises of the password file need to be taken seriously. In this 
paper we propose three different password protection schemes which preserve system security even if the 
password file is compromised. These schemes are based on the concepts of public-key cryptography: 
public-key encryption, public-key distribution and quadratic residues. In each scheme the user’s password 
is effectively bound to the user’s identification, regardless of the state of the password file, in a time-efficient 
and simple manner. We discuss the special features, degree of secrecy, advantages and disadvantages for 
each scheme. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
With the rapid advance of science and technology, more and more people rely on modern 
computers and networks to communicate with each other, and to store and process information. 
One side effect of this trend is that the availability of electronically stored information to illegitimate 
users has also increased. Due to the distributed nature of the network architecture and the increased 
demands of sharing resources and exchanging data among users, protection mechanisms residing 
within each individual computer become inadequate to insure the security of communications 
across the network. Hence a security enforcement mechanism for the network is required to prevent 
information from being destroyed, altered, disclosed or copied. Various kinds of protection 
schemes have been employed so far. Among them, the password authentication schemes draw 
special attention because of their inexpensiveness, ease of implementation and user friendliness. 
The security of conventional password authentication schemes depends on the following: 
(a) strong and effective protection schemes for the system’s password file; 
(b) high degree of difficulty for an intruder to compromise users’ passwords by 
exhaustive search 
and 
(c) users taking precautions to prevent their passwords from being lost. 
In a distributed environment, it is possible to implement network security functions on top of 
the transport or presentation layer. Such implementations ease the task of modifying existing 
operating systems, whereas they lack the capability of providing full protection of security-relevant 
secret information, such as password files, from being disclosed. To solve this problem, new 
schemes have been proposed such that even if the password file is compromised, the system security 
is still retained [l, 21. This goal can be achieved if a scheme ensures that 
(a) no passwords are stored in clear text form in the password file; 
(b) an intruder is unable to derive users’ passwords from any information he could 
possibly obtain in the password file 
and 
(c) no alteration or modification of the password file could help an intruder to get 
into the system. 
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In our proposed schemes, since users’ passwords are not stored in the system directly, the 
password file is replaced by an authentication table (alternatively called “verification table”). 
Information on this table does not need to be protected because any disclosure of it will not 
threaten the system’s ecurity. In each scheme, a user’s password is effectively tied with his ID so 
that even if data stored in the verification table is modified (or altered) by an unauthorized user, 
the system’s ecurity is still preserved. 
In each proposed scheme, users’ passwords tend to be long due to the special feature of the 
public-key algorithm which we have chosen. This is advantageous from the system’s security 
point of view since short, easily remembered passwords may be too easy to find by exhaustive 
search. However, in practice, users may not like to use long passwords. A possible solution is 
to divide a whole password into two parts: the first part is kept by the user, and the second part 
is encrypted and stored in the table by the system, and concatenated to the first part when a user 
is logging in. 
All three proposed schemes possess the merits of keeping real-time user login fast and simple; 
besides, when it is necessary to have the verification updated, the system can do it alone without 
notifying the users. The implementations of these schemes are based on the concepts of public-key 
cryptography such as the public-key encryption algorithm [3], public-key distribution algorithm [4] 
and quadratic residue algorithm [5]. 
We will briefly review conventional password authentication schemes in the next section. Three 
new password authentication schemes will be described in three sections, respectively. In each 
section, we will first describe the proposed scheme, then discuss relevant aspects of the scheme such 
as security analysis, advantages and trade-offs. Examples are also included to illustrate the concepts. 
2. BRIEF REVIEW 
The traditional way to achieve password authentication is through the use of a password table 
(Fig. 1) stored in the host processor. 
Since users’ passwords are stored in the table directly, disclosure of this table will destroy the 
system’s security completely. Purdy [6] has developed a scheme where each user’s password is 
transformed by a one-way function F and stored as a ciphertext in verification table (Fig. 2). 
Since F(X) is a one-way function, anyone who knows F(X) cannot derive X. While this 
scheme prevents users’ passwords from being disclosed, it will not protect the system against an 
intruder’s unauthorized use by altering data stored in the verification table, as pointed out by 
Lennon et al. [7]. 
In Lennon et ai.% approach, a special test pattern (TP) was stored in the table instead, which 
can be used later on to generate a verification pattern (VP) for verification purpose during the user’s 
r 
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Password Table 
‘D 1 
ID2 
PWI 
PW2 
ID correct?kNo, reject 
stored F(PWi) 
r-i 
‘Dl F(PW ,) 
‘D2 1 F(PW2) 
F(PWi )’ 
i 
F(PWi)‘= F(PWi) ? 
Yes, login complete 
Fig. 1. Table of stored password. Fig. 2. Authentication of passwords by using a verification table 
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logging in process. The test pattern is generated by utilizing a one-way function F, and a 
cryptographic deciphering operation D with host master key MK such that 
VP = F(ID), 
KA = D,,(PW) 
and 
TP = DKA(VP), 
where VP is called the verification pattern of ID and KA is a transient cryptographic key. The 
working process is shown in Fig. 3. 
As pointed out by Hwang [2], this scheme has several disadvantages: 
(1) 
(2) 
In order to generate TP, each user must first submit his password to the 
system administrator. The password might thus be leaked or kept by system 
administrator for future unauthorized use. 
Each time when the verification table needs to be updated, either the system has 
to assign a new password to each user, or each user must submit his current 
password to system administrator to generate the corresponding new test 
pattern, which is troublesome, and each user suffers the risk of exposing his 
password. 
In 1983, Hwang proposed an authentication scheme using the public-key encryption method. In 
Hwang’s approach, each user has a pair of keys: D, and E,, where D, stands for a user’s secret 
key which is known to himself only, and E, is his public-key which can be distributed publicly. 
E, resides in a public-key file (probably with the host). Similarly, the system also has a pair of keys: 
Es and D,, where D, is the system’s ecret key, and Es can be known by the public. Each pair of 
keys have the important property that 
E(D(M)) = D(E(M)) = M. 
Hwang’s method is depicted in Fig. 4. 
PWj IDi 
1 retrleveTPi from table 
VP’, q EKA (TPi ) 
ID1 TP, 
ID2 TP2 
ID, TP, 
1 Yes,logln complete 
Fig. 3. Authentication based on test pattern. 
PWi ID 
I’ 
TPi 
ID, TP, 
TV 
VP’, =VPt 7 * 
No, reject 
Yes,login complete 
Fig. 4. Authentication based on public-key encryption. 
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The test pattern generation process works as follows. Upon registration, user Vi submits his ID, 
and E, to the system. The system then uses user’s (IDi, E,), together with the host’s (Es, D,), to 
securely generate the test pattern TP, by letting 
VP, = Es(ID,),1- 
and 
TP, = &(E,(VP,)). 
While logging in, user Ui submits (IDi, PW,) with PW, = D,. At first, the system checks the format 
of ID, to ensure its validity. If correct, its corresponding TP, is retrieved from the verification table. 
The system then generates a VP: such that 
VP; = D,(E,(TP,)). 
This VP; is then compared with VP, = E,(ID,) for equality. The authentication procedure is then 
complete. 
This authentication method is asserted to have the advantages that there is no need to protect 
anything in the system for authentication purpose, users are not disturbed while updating the 
verification table, and threats coming from inside people are reduced. However, the user’s logging 
in and verification table updating processes are rather lengthy because of the multi-exponential 
computations associated with them. 
3. PASSWORD AUTHENTICATION BASED ON 
PUBLIC-KEY DISTRIBUTION CRYPTOSYSTEM 
The first password authentication scheme utilizes the concept proposed by Diffie and Hellman 
[4] for a public-key distribution cryptosystem. For the reader’s convenience, we briefly review this 
algorithm. 
3.1. DlJ?ie and Hellman ‘s Scheme 
Diffie and Hellman’s public-key distribution scheme is based on the computational difficulty of 
computing discrete logarithms. The scheme works as follows. 
Users A and B randomly select two numbers X, and X,, respectively, in the interval [l, P - l] 
as their individual secret keys, where P is a large prime number publicly available, and compute 
the corresponding Y, and Y, such that 
and 
Y, =a’, mod P 
Ye=aXBmodP, 
for some primitive number a. YA and Y, are also made publicly available. X, and X, cannot be 
practically computed from Y, and Y,, for sufficiently large X, and X,. Then there exists a common 
secret key KA, B shared by users A and B such that KA, B = Yp mod P = Yp mod P = axA “B mod P. 
3.2. The Proposed Scheme 
Since this scheme is based on the Diffie and Hellman’s public-key distribution scheme, each user 
as well as the system must have a pair of keys: one kept secret, and the other known bo the public. 
Let each authorized user select a random secret key Xi in the interval [l, P - 11, and the host system 
also select a random secret key X, in the same interval, where P is a large prime number publicly 
available. Each user i computes a public key Yi such that 
Y, = ID? mod P. (1) 
tEach pair of parentheses tands for one exponential computation. 
Password authentication using public-key cryptography 1005 
Here ID, represents user i’s valid identification number. In registration, each user submits his Y, 
and ID, to the host system, and keeps his secret key Xi as his private password PW,. 
There is a verification table stored in the host. Within this table, there are two elements associated 
with each entry: ID, and VP, , where ID, is user i’s valid identification number, and VP, is user 
i’s verification pattern calculated by the host based on the following equation: 
VP, = YF mod P, (2) 
where X, is the system’s ecret master key: Yi is user i’s public key submitted to the system upon 
registration and P is the publicly available large prime. 
All VPs are computed and stored along with their corresponding IDS in the verification table 
as shown in Fig. 5 during system’s initialization time. 
While logging in, user i submits (ID,, PW,) with PW, = Xi. The system first checks the validity 
of user i’s ID. If it is OK, the system will do the following: 
(a) retrieve VP, from the verification table; 
(b) calculate the system’s verification key (VKS,) by using X,, ID,, and the formula 
VKS, = ID? mod P (3) 
and 
(c) calculate 
VP; = VKSPWi mod P I (4) 
and compare VP; with Vpi. If they match each other, login succeeds; otherwise user i is rejected. 
Equations (l)-(4) indicate that in order for VP; to be equal to VP,, user i must submit his unique, 
valid pair ID, and PW,. Since 
Yi = ID? mod P 
and 
then 
VKS, = ID? mod P, 
VP, = YF mod P = ID;“’ l 4 mod P = VKSF mod P = VP; 
is true if and only if ID, and Xi are both valid and pairwise correct. 
r 
VP1 ‘IVKS,~~~ mod p I 
PW 
ID correct1 
No, Reject 
w 
1 Yes 
compute 
VKSI : ID, ” mod p 
VP1 
VP2 
IDn vpn 
Retrieve VP from verlficatlon 
Fig. 5. Authentication based upon public-key distribution algorithm. 
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3.3. Security Analysis 
There are four possible attacks on this scheme: 
Attack (a). Since Y, is publicly known and evaluated according to equation (l), any intruder can 
derive user’s password, PW,, by solving discrete logarithms. However, to actually do this is believed 
to be a computationally infeasible problem. 
Attack (b). Since Y, is publicly known and VP, is also available in the verification table, if an 
intruder can derive the system master key X, from equation (2), then he can successfully log in by 
modifying the verification table. However, the difficulty of computing X, from Y, is the same as 
that of breaking Diffie and Hellman’s public-key system for computing discrete logarithms over 
finite field GF(P). 
Attack (c). Since the verification table does not need to be protected, a possible attack is that 
a legitimate user who has a valid PW can alter other’s VP in the table for illegimate use. However, 
since each user’s password and his ID are effectively tied together, any alteration to VP on the table 
can be detected. 
Attack (d). An intruder tries to log in by exhaustively selecting random pairs of PW and ID. 
Since ID and PW are uniformly distributed in the range [l, P - 11, the probability of selecting a 
valid pair of PW and ID is extremely small. 
3.4. Discussion 
By using Diffie and Hellman’s public-key distribution cryptosystem as the basic mathematical 
model, we have presented our first password authentication scheme. We believe this scheme has 
the following advantages: 
(1) There is no need to protect the verification table. This is due to the distinct 
property of public-key cryptosystems that, given a public key, it is computation- 
ally infeasible to derive the corresponding private key. In other words, an 
intruder will not be able to derive either users’ passwords or system’s master key 
from the information appearing on the verification table. Since VP, is a function 
of user i’s public key Yi, and Y, is a function of both user i’s ID, and PW,, any 
unauthorized modification or alteration of data on the verification table will 
destroy the equality between VP and VP. This feature effectively lessens the 
burden on the operating system to provide full protection of the verification 
table. 
(2) In this scheme, when the verification table needs to be updated, there is no need 
to inform the users. The system only needs to have its master key X, changed, 
and compute new VP based on the user’s old ID and old public key. This makes 
the regeneration process of VP rather simple. 
(3) Comparing this scheme with Hwang’s method [2] proposed in 1983, our scheme 
is faster. In our scheme, only two exponential computations are involved during 
a user’s login process; in Hwang’s scheme there are three for the same process. 
The verification table generating and updating processes of our scheme are also 
simpler than his. 
One possible problem of this scheme is that because the security of users’ passwords rests on 
the complexity of computing discrete logarithms [8, p. 1051, in order for each user’s password to 
be invulnerable, all passwords must be fairly large in magnitude. According to Denning [8], 
assuming a computer can perform 10” operations per day, a password consisting of 250 bits 
would require approximately one year to be broken by trying out all possible combinations. If 
one character corresponds to 8 bits in binary, then 250 bits would correspond to 32 charac- 
ters! This is in practice too large for most users. One way we suggest o solve this problem is the 
following. 
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Let user i select his secret number X,, in the range [I, P - 11, of a convenient size. Upon 
registration, instead of computing Y, = ID? mod P, user i submits his Xi and ID, to the host system 
in a secured manner. The system computes 
VKSi = ID? mod P, 
yi = ID” mod P, 
where 
R = Xi~VKSi (reads R = Xi concatenated with VKSi), 
and 
VP, = YF mod P. 
All the above computations are evalutated uring system’s initialization time. Yi need not be kept 
secret. 
While logging in, user i submits (ID,, PW,) with PW, = Xi. The system first checks the validity 
of user i’s ID. If it is OK, the system will do the following: 
(a) calculate VKSi = ID? mod P; 
(b) retrieve VP, from the verification table 
and 
(c) calculate VP/ = VKS PW+VKSi mod P and compare VP; with VP,. 
If these two values are equal, user i logs in successfully. 
In this modified scheme, the “effective” password is expanded from PW to a much larger value 
PWcVKS, and Y is computed by the system during initialization time. With these modifications, 
even though a user selects a relatively small password, and Y and ID are publicly known, we believe 
that to derive PWi from the equation 
Yi = ID~W+VKS~ modP 
is practically intractable. 
The modified scheme gives each user more flexibility in selecting his own password; invulnera- 
bility of the selected password is also ensured. All the advantages which we have described 
previously are still maintained. 
The major trade-off of this scheme is that we are not able to totally eliminate the use of the 
system’s secret key during user’s login process, which may result in exposure of that key, thus 
putting the system in danger. The second scheme we are going to present in the next section will 
be able to eliminate the use of the system’s secret key completely during real-time logging in. 
4. PASSWORD AUTHENTICATION BASED ON QUADRATIC RESIDUES 
The second password authentication scheme is based on the theory of computing quadratic 
residues [9]. In order for this scheme to be applicable, one necessary condition is that the users’ 
passwords must be provided by the system instead of by users themselves. Under certain 
circumstances, this requirement is reasonable and advantageous. For example, suppose each user’s 
password represents his access previlege key to an object and this key can be determined only by 
the system. Before we introduce this scheme, the theory of quadratic residues is first reviewed. 
4.1. Review of Quadratic Residues [8, pp. Ill-1161 
A number a is said to be a quadratic residue (QR) mod n if gcd(a, n) = 1 and there exists an 
X such that 
X2modn =u modn. 
Otherwise u is said to be a quadratic nonresidue (NQR) mod n. 
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Example 
Let n = 13. Then 3 is a QR because 4’ mod 13 = 3. But 7 is an NQR since there does not exist 
any X in the range [1, 121 such that X2 mod 13 = 7. 
If n is a prime, then we may use the following theorem [8] to determine whether a is a QR mod n : 
Theorem 4.1 
For prime n > 2 and 0 < a < n, a(n-‘)‘2 modn = 1, if a is a QR,=n - 1, if a is an NQR. 
If n is a product of two odd primes p and q and gcd(a, n) = 1, then there are four possibilities: 
(i) a is a QR to both p and q; 
(ii) a is a QR to p, but an NQR to q; 
(iii) a is an NQR to p, but a QR to q; 
(iv) a is an NQR to both p and q. 
To test if a satisfies (i), (ii), (iii) or (iv) mod n, where n = p * q, we need to apply Theorem 4.1 twice. 
Theorem 4.2 [9] 
QR * QR = QR; NQR * NQR = QR; QR * NQR = NQR. 
Stated in words, the product of two quadratic residues is a quadratic residue; the product of two 
quadratic nonresidues is a quadratic residue; the product of a quadratic residue and a quadratic 
nonresidue is a quadratic nonresidue. 
For prime p > 2, there are (p - 1)/2 quadratic residues modp and (p - 1)/2 quadratic 
nonresidues. The (p - 1)/2 quadratic residues are: 
12, 22, 32, . . . ((p - 1)/2)2 modp. 
The next section gives a detailed description of our authentication scheme based on the theory 
of quadratic residues. 
4.2. The Proposed Scheme 
Let the system select two large primes p and q such that both p + 1 and q + 1 are divisible by 4, 
and compute n = p * q. Let n be known to the public, and p and q be kept secret. In registration, 
each user submits his ID to the system, and the system computes the corresponding password 
according to the equation 
ID’ = PW2 mod n. (5) 
where ID’ is called the modified ID, the nature of which will be described later. 
In order for equation (5) to be meaningful (i.e. PW does exist), ID’ must be a quadratic residue 
to both p and q. If this is indeed true, then there exists four roots of ID’: 
PWl, n -PWl, PW2 and n -PW2. 
For sufficiently large p and q, it is believed that the computation of these roots is extremely difficult 
without knowing p and q. 
Upon receiving each user’s ID, it is necessary to test if this given ID satisfies the condition that 
it is a quadratic residue to both p and q before equation (5) can be applied and user’s password 
can be generated. If a given ID does not satisfy this condition, then some modifications must be 
made. Since all testing and modifications are done during system’s initialization, this will not 
lengthen the real-time user login process. The relationship between a given ID and a modified ID 
(written as ID’) can be expressed as 
ID=k *ID’. 
where k can be either a, /?, o or A and a, /3, o and 1 are four distinct integers with distinct properties 
to be described shortly. 
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Knowing p and q, the system can easily compute the sets of QRs and NQRs for both p and q: 
SET,,_P = { 12, 2*, . . . ((p - 1)/2)2 modp}; 
SETNQR_, = {other QS that are not in SETo,_P and 0 <a <p}; 
SETo,_q = {l*, 2*, . . . ((4 - 1)/2* mod 4); 
SETNca_, = {other as that are not in SETc,_q and 0 < a < q}. 
Once the above four sets are determined, the system will determine LX, 8, 0 and 1 as follows: 
c( = an integer common to both SEToR_, 
and q); 
and SETo,_q (so that u is a QR to both p 
/? = an integer common to both SETc,_I and SET,,,_q (so that fl is a QR to p and 
an NQR to q); 
c = an integer common to both SETNca_p and SET,,_q (so that (T is an NQR to p 
and a QR to q); 
L = an integer common to both SETNoR_, and SET,c,_q (so that 1 is an NQR to both 
P and 4). 
Once ct, /.I, u and 1 are randomly selected, SETc,_p, SET,c,_P, SETo,_q and SET,c,_q can be 
discarded. 
To ensure system’s ecurity while applying this mechanism, one necessary condition is that p and 
q must be large primes, say 100 bits each. In this case, the computation of SETo,_P, SET,Q,_p, 
SETQR_~ and SET,,,_ could be enormous and cumbersome. However, it is possible to select a, 
/I,. c and 1 without computing the whole sets of QRs and NQRs of both p and q. This method 
is shown in Fig. 6. 
. . ..~.*.tt**tttt~****.**..*.~*************.*******.*.**~.**~ 
Procedure cal_mdfr( a. p, u, h ); 
Begin a=O; p=O; o=O; h=Oi 
Repeat 
Randomly select a k such that 1 < k < min ( p, q ); 
if (k(p-‘)I* mod p -1) then (’ if k is a QR to p l ) 
if ( k(q-‘)‘* mod q -1 ) and (’ and k is a QR to q ‘) 
(a=O)then a=k (’ map k to a l ) 
else (’ k is a QR to p but a NQR to q ‘) 
if (p-0) then p -k (’ map k to p l ) 
end else (’ if k is a NQR to p ‘) 
if ( k(q-‘)I* mod q -1 ) and (’ and a QR to q ‘) 
( u - 0 ) then u - k (’ map k to a l ) 
else if ( X -0 ) then (’ if k 1s a NQR to both p and q ‘) 
I-k (‘mapktoX’) 
until ( acr0; p<>O; UC> 0; and licr 0 ); 
Fig. 6. Select tl, 8, u and 1 without computing SET,+, SETNoR_,, SETo,,_*, and SET,,,+. 
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It is necessary to have a verification table within the system and all valid IDS are recorded onto 
this table. Associated with each ID there is another entry consisting of two bits: i andj (see Fig. 9). 
These two bits will tell the system, upon receiving user i’s ID, during real-time login, which modifier, 
CI, /I, c or 1, should be used to modify ID, to ID:. In other words, a, /I, c and 1 are not stored 
in the verification table directly; instead they should be kept in a read-only-memory (ROM). There 
is no need to keep these numbers secret, but any modifications of these numbers must be prevented. 
Figure 7 gives the testing and modification procedure for a given user ID. The major functions 
of this procedure are: 
(1) test whether a given ID is a QR to both p and q; 
(2) determine the correct modifier which will convert ID into the desired form 
and 
(3) set bits i and j associated with each ID on the verification table accordingly. 
This procedure is run during system’s initialization. 
Once a given ID is tested and modified, and the two bits i, j associated with that ID on the 
verification table are set accordingly, the next step is to calculate a root from the equation 
ID’ = PW* mod n (6) 
and send it through a secured channel to the user as his password. Equation (6) has four roots 
because n is a product of two distinct prime numbers. Since we are interested in generating only 
one password corresponding to each ID, the procedure given in Fig. 8 can be used to compute 
one root out of the four. For more detailed discussion on how to compute roots for quadratic 
Procedure TM-ID (ID); 
Begin 
if ID..((p-1)/2) mod p = 1 (’ if ID is a QR to p l ) 
and ID .. ((q-1)/2) mod q =l (’ and if ID is a QR to q l ) 
then Begin 
ID := o + ID; i := j :- 0; (’ set bits i and j on table to 0,O’) 
end 
else if ID ** ((p-1)12) mod p -1 
and ID ** ((q-1)12) mod q <> 1 
then Begin 
ID :I j3 * ID; h-0; j:-1; 
end 
(’ if ID is a QR to p l ) 
(’ but a NQR to q ‘) 
(’ set bits i, j on table to 0,l ‘) 
else if ID ** ((p-1)/2) mod p <> 1 (’ if ID is a NQR to p l ) 
and ID ** ((q-1)/2) mod q -1 (’ but a QR to q ‘) 
then Begin 
ID :- u l * ID; i :-I; j :I 0; (’ set i, j on table to 1,0 l ) 
end 
else Begin 
end; 
ID :I h ** ID; i :-1: j :=I; (’ Set i, j on table to 1.1 ‘) 
end: 
t*t***.t~*****~t~**t~.~*~~*.~~**~.*..~*..**~***~**~***.***.* 
Fig. 7. Test and modify a given ID. 
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Procedure calc_PW ( ID, PW ); 
Begin 
Xl :- ID +* ((p+1)/4) mod p; 
x2 :- ID ++ ((q+l)/4) mod q; 
Yl :- inv ((n/p) mod p, p ); 
Y2 := inv ((n/q) mod q, q ); 
PW := [ ((n/p) * Yl * Xl + ((n/q) * Y2 * X2 ) mod n: 
end; 
Fig. 8. Compute password from a user ID. 
residues, see Ref. [8, pp. 11 l-l 161. The procedure given in Fig. 8 assumes that a given ID has 
already been tested and modified to be a QR to both p and q if necessary. 
Once users’ passwords are computed, the system’s initialization is completed. Password is 
transmitted to user in a secured manner, and there is no need for the system to keep a copy of 
it. What the system has is a verification table as shown in Fig. 9. 
While logging in (Fig. 9), user i submits his ID, and PW,. The system first checks the validity 
of user i’s ID. If it is OK, the system will do the following: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
Example 
examine bits i, j of the table, and retrieve the corresponding modifier k from 
ROM; 
calculate ID’ = k * ID,; 
Calculate ID: = PW: mod n and compare ID; with ID;. If they match with each 
other, login succeeds. 
As a numerical example, assume p = 7, q = 11, and n = p * q = 77. Note that p + 1 and q + 1 
are both divisible by 4 
SETo,_p = { 1,2,4}; SET,,,,, = (3,5,6}; SET,,_q = { 1,3,4,5,9}; SE&R_, = {2,6,7,8, lo}. 
I I tlodifler Table I -- (ROM) 
Fig. 9. Password authentication based on a quadratic residue. 
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Let x = 4, p = 2, g = 5 and i. = 6. 
Suppose passwords for three users with ID, = 3, ID, = 2 and ID, = 6 are to be computed. From 
the procedure in Fig. 6, the system finds out that 
ID, = 3, is an NQR to p, a QR to q; 
ID, = 2, is a QR to p, an NQR to q; 
ID, = 6, is an NQR to p, an NQR to q. 
Thus the modified IDS become 
ID; = ID, *(r = 3 + 5 = 15, 
ID;=ID,*fl=2*2=4 
and 
ID;=ID,*A =6*6=36. 
The verification table is shown in Fig. 10. 
Using the procedure given in Fig. 8, the following PWs are calculated: 
PW, = 64, PW, = 9 and PW, = 71. 
If user with ID, wants to log into the system, he submits ID, = 3 and PW, = 64 to the system. 
The system retrieves cr = 5 from ROM, computes ID; = ID, * 0 = 15, ID; = PW: mod n = 15, and 
compares these two values. Since ID: = ID;, user 1 logs in successfully. 
4.3. Security Analysis 
The security of this scheme depends on the difficulty of factoring n into two large prime numbers 
p and q. Rivest et al. [3] suggests using 100 digits. In addition, both p - 1 and q - 1 should contain 
large prime factors and gcd(p - 1, q - 1) should be small. Since each user’s ID and PW are tied 
together as in equation (6), attack (c) as described in Section 3.3 can be prevented. 
4.4. Discussion 
The major advantages of this scheme are (1) the elimination of secret information from the 
verification table and (2) the speed and simplicity of user’s real-time login which involves only one 
normal multiplication and one modular multiplication. Compared with most one-way functions 
which generally involve a number of exponential operations (such as RSA [3]), this method is much 
more time efficient. 
The system security depends on the difficulty of factoring p and q from n. Thus we suggest using 
a large n to ensure the security. The password generated from the system will be uniformly 
distributed in the range [ 1, n - 11. However, as we have discussed in previous sections, most people 
have the intention to use short, easily-remembered passwords. In order to compromise between 
user’s preference and the system’s security requirements, we suggest that each time a user’s 
password is generated, only part of it, say 7-10 characters (i.e. 56-80 bits) is given to the user; the 
remainder of the password is scrambled and stored in the table by the system. During user’s login, 
this scrambled portion is retrieved from the table, restored to its original form by the system, and 
concatenated with the other part which is supplied by the user while he is logging in. From this 
point onwards the authentication procedures discussed in Section 3.2 resume. 
Verification Table 
Fig. 10. Verification table and modifier table for Section 3.2 example. 
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One major problem of this proposed scheme is that the password generating process is 
time-consuming. The application of the Chinese remainder theorem and modular exponential 
operations are both involved. The third method which we are going to present in the next section 
provides an efficient way for generating a password during the initialization time. However, the 
trade-off is that the user’s login process is slower than this scheme. 
5. PASSWORD AUTHENTICATION BASED ON PUBLIC-KEY ENCRYPTION 
The third password authentication scheme is based on the public-key encryption mechanism. 
It is motivated by the RSA public-key scheme [3]. It also requires that the system generate 
users’ passwords. Before we describe the mechanism itself, the underlying mathematics is first 
reviewed. For more detailed description about the mathematical background, we recommend 
readers to read Ref. [8, p. 42, 31. 
5.1. The Underlying Mathematics 
Euler’s generalization theorem [8, p. 421 
If n is a product of two large primes p and q, and 4(n) = (p - l)*(q - I), then a’*“(“) mod n = 1 
for every integer a relatively prime to n. 
Based on the above theorem, we can prove the following important theorem. 
Theorem 5. I 
If we select an X, such that 1 < X, < 4(n) - 1 and X, is relatively prime to 4(n), then there 
always exists an integer PW in [l, 4(n) - 1] such that X, * PW mod 4(n) = EID. Also 
aEIDmodn =axsrPwmodn. 
Proof. The existence part of this theorem can be found in Ref. [8, p. 421. However, since 
X, * PW mod 4(n) = EID, 
it follows that 
X,*PW=t *$(n)+EID. 
where t is a positive integer. Hence 
a%‘PWmodn =a”“‘“‘+Eiumodn =aEin a”*&‘modn =aE’umodn. 
Q.E.D. 
Since X, * PW mod 4(n) = EID, then if X,, EID and 4(n) are known, PW can be easily 
calculated as follows: 
First compute W such that 
X,* Wmod4(n)= 1. 
Then since 
it follows that 
X,*EIDs Wmod+(n)=EID, 
PW = EID * W mod 4(n). 
5.2. The Proposed Scheme 
To make this scheme work, the system needs to pick two distinct large primes p and q, and 
compute 
n =p *q and +(n)=(p - l)*(q - 1). 
The system then selects its secret master key X, and integer a such that X, is in the range 
[ I,# (n) - 1] and relatively prime to 4 (n), and a is in the range [ 1, n - 1] and relatively prime to n. 
C.A.M.W.A. 18,124 
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From the values of X,, a and n, the system calculates its public key by the equation 
Ys = aXs mod n. 
Among the above numbers, p, q, 4(n), a and X, must be kept secret, and n and Y, can be made 
public. The whole process consists of two parts: password generation and user-login authentication. 
We shall describe them in two different subsections. 
5.2.1. Password generation 
During system’s initialization, each authorized user must register by submitting his ID to the 
system. The system first computes 
W = inv(X,) mod 4(n), 
then computes each user’s EID, the “extended identification”, and the corresponding password, 
PW, as follows: 
EID, = aID! mod n 
and 
PWi=EIDi* Wmod$(n). (7) 
Each computed password is transmitted to its user in a secured manner. The system does not keep 
a copy of it. 
5.2.2. User -login authentication 
During real-time login, the following values are needed: 
(1) the nonsecret information n and Y, 
(2) the secret information a. 
All the other secret numbers, X,, p, q, 4(n) and W, should be kept away from the processor to 
minimize the possibility of being exposed. 
Now suppose user i wants to log into the system. He submits his ID, and PWi. The system 
proceeds as follows: 
Compute 
EID. = aID1 mod n 
VP] = a E’Dl mod i 
and 
VP: = YSpwf mod n. 
Compare 
VP, with VPj. 
If they match, login is a success. 
The user-login procedure is illustrated in Fig. 11. 
Example 
As a numerical example, suppose the host system selects the following numbers: 
p=ll, q=7, X,=17 and a=lO. 
Then 
n =p*q = 77, 
and 
#(n) = (p - I)*(q - 1) = 60 
Y, = ax’ mod n = 54. 
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No, reject 
Yes 
- ‘Dl 
ID2 
Retrieve ID from . 
table 
r 
t 
VP,” VP, 7 
Fig. 11. Password authentication based on public-key encryption. 
In order to compute user 
the system first computes 
i’s PW from the equation 
EID, = X, * PW, mod 4(n), 
W, the modular inverse of X, such that 
A’,* Wmod+(n)= 1. 
In this example, W = 53. 
Suppose users with IDS 2, 3, 4 and 5 are authorized to have access to the system and want to 
have their individual passwords computed. Upon receiving these IDS, the system first computes 
each user’s EID from the equation 
EID, = aID, mod n , 
then computes each user’s password from the equation 
PW, = W * EID, mod 4(n). 
The calculated results turns out to be 
ID# EID FW 
2 23 19 
3 76 8 
4 67 11 
5 54 42 
Passwords are transmitted to users securely. 
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Now suppose user i with ID, = 2 wants to log in. He submits ID, = 2 and PW, = 19 to the system. 
The system performs the authentication procedure as follows: 
Compute 
EID. = aID< mod n = 23, 
VP) = ~~‘~1 mod n = 10z3 mod 77 = 54, 
VP: = Ypwl mod n = 5419 mod 77 = 54. 
Compare VP, with VP;. 
Since they match with each other, login completes. 
5.3. Security Analysis 
As for the second scheme described in Section 4, the security of this scheme depends on the 
difficulty of factoring p and q from n. Since p and q are chosen by the system, we suggest using 
large primes for both p and q. There are two possible attacks on this scheme: 
Attack (a). If the system’s master secret key X, is exposed, then any pair of ID and PW satisfying 
the equation 
ID=X,*PW and OcID<r$(n)-1 
can help an unauthorized user to log in successfully. However, deriving X, from Y, is a discrete 
logarithm problem. Therefore this attack cannot work properly. 
Attack (6). In the conspiracy of two valid users who know two pairs of EID and PW, there exists 
a possibility that they can derive the system’s ecret key W and 4(n) from equation (7). However, 
since the system keeps a as a secret key, therefore each user does not even know their corresponding 
extended identification, EID. This attack cannot work properly. 
5.4. Discussions 
The major advantage of this scheme is that it provides an efficient way for the system to generate 
users’ passwords during the initialization time. However, the trade-off is that the login process 
needs three exponential computations; thus it is more time-consuming in comparison with the 
second scheme. 
Since users’ passwords are computed from the equation 
PW=EID* wmod4(n), 
the larger the n, the larger the 4(n). Larger 4(n) results in larger passwords. From system’s point 
of view this is advantageous ince the difficulty of solving discrete logarithms also depends on the 
size of the exponent. In our scheme this exponent is equivalent to each user’s password! The 
suggested way to compromise between user’s preference and the system’s ecurity requirement can 
be found in Section 4.4. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
We have proposed three different password authentication schemes based on public-key 
cryptography. These schemes have the following common features: 
(1) Users’ passwords are not stored directly in the host system, thus password files 
can be eliminated. Instead authentication tables are used, and all information on 
these tables can be made public without threatening the system security. 
(2) Due to the nature of public-key cryptography, users’ passwords in all three 
schemes tend to be long. This is advantageous from system’s point of view, but 
contradictory to most users’ preference. We have suggested ways to compromise 
between this gap so that users’ preference is considered and, on the other hand, 
system’s security requirements are also satisfied. 
Password authentication using public-key cryptography 1017 
Besides, each scheme has its own advantages and trade-offs. For example, the first scheme has 
the flexibility of letting each user choose his own password; the second scheme requires that the 
system provides users’ passwords, but has the merit of making the real-time logging in faster than 
the other two; the third scheme provides a more efficient way to generate user’s passwo.rd compared 
with the second scheme. 
We believe our proposed schemes are more suitable for the applications in a distributed 
environment where authentication services are beyond the level of protection of the existing 
operating systems. The security of all these three schemes are believed to be equivalent o the most 
well-known public-key algorithms. 
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